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I nternal risk management models and downside-risk measures such as Value-at-Risk (VaR)  play an important role in contemporary banking practice. VaR
measures the maximum loss born by a bank or other financial institution over a
certain time period and given a certain level of confidence. Following the Basle
guidelines for bank supervision, many supervisory institutions require banks to
use such models and to report VaR measures on a regular basis. Capital re-
quirements for the bank are then directly related to its reported VaR figure. In
principle, following the Basle guidelines based on the internal models approach,
banks are allowed to design their own risk management models for computing
their VaR.  This raises the question whether banks have any impetus to come up
with correct models in the sense that the VaR predicted by the model matches the
true VaR.  This question is addressed in the present paper. In our model, banks
assign negative utility to required capital reserves due to opportunity costs. US-
ing a stylized representation of the Basle guidelines for backtesting internal risk
models, we investigate whether banks are inclined to choose overly prudent or
overly risky internal models. We check the robustness of the result by varying the
planning horizon of the bank and the degree of fat-tailedness of the bank’s asset
and liability portfolio. It generally turns out that banks have a strong incentive
to use internal models that under-estimate the true VaR of the bank’s portfolio.
Monetary penalties should be set substantially higher by supervisory institutions
to realize a closer match between reported and actual VaR.
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. 1. Introduction
Financial markets have become more and more efficient over the last decades.
Some causes underlying these developments are the steady decline of the
number of regulatory conditions and the continuing progress in the field of
information technology. Also the increased understanding of the advantages
and risks associated with contemporary financial instruments like derivatives
has led to efficiency gains in pricing financial products and allocating risks
over the different participants in the market. These rapid developments in
financial markets have also led to less favorable experiences, some of the most
well-known of which include the abuse of derivatives and the lack of adequate
supervision, e.g., Orange County, Metallgesellschaft, and Barings.
Spurred by such dramatic experiences and by the huge activity growth in
financial markets in general, supervisory institutions have tried to come up
with adequate guidelines for supervision. Part of these include the formula-
tion of capital requirements to cover unexpected market risks run by banks
and other financial institutions, see the report by the Basle Supervisory Com-
mittee (BSC, 1996b). Market risks are the risks due to (price) fluctuations
in financial markets. Especially if one holds an investment portfolio that is
highly leveraged (e.g., due to the use of options), market risk can become
a substantial part of the firm’s total risk profile. From a supervisory point
of view, it is important that the market risk is managed adequately. On
the one hand, this requires a good internal risk management and supervi-
sion practice, evidenced by the competence of responsible management and
a functional separation between front-office and back-office. On the other
hand, it requires the availability of a sufficient amount of funds to cover liq-
uidity risks in cases of highly adverse market fluctuations. There are at least
two reasons for the importance of capital reserves to cover market risk in
contemporary financial markets. First, many financial contracts are settled
on a frequent (e.g., daily) basis through the use of margin accounts. Con-
sequently, adverse market movements are translated directly into financial
losses at the end of the day. If fluctuations are very large, as for example
in situations of market stress, these losses can become substantial. Second,
if market movements suddenly become highly adverse, as in the case of a
market crash, the liquidity in the market can evaporate very rapidly. As
a result, unprofitable parts of the portfolio can in such cases not be liqui-
dated in time and monetary losses have to be suffered. In order to stimulate
the stability of the financial system, supervisory institutions have come up
with guidelines regarding required capital reserves for financial institutions
for covering these market risks.
One of the crucial elements of the Basle proposals for capital adequacy
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and capital reserve requirements is that banks are allowed to use their own
models for computing the required amount of capital, BSC (1996a,b). Earlier
attempts by the BSC to formulate guidelines for capital requirements based
on a standard approach applicable to all banks were met by much criticism by
the profession. In reply, the internal models approach was formulated. The
advantage of permitting banks to use their internal risk management models
to compute their market risk is that expert knowledge can be incorporated
quite easily. Moreover, the use of internal models allows for the inclusion of
all kinds of particular details with respect to the bank’s portfolio composition
and trading strategy.
The market risk is quantified using the concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR).
The VaR is the maximum loss that can occur during a certain period of time
given a certain confidence level. In our setting, the VaR corresponds to a
specific quantile of the profit/loss distribution of the bank’s portfolio. For a
textbook treatment on VaR, see Jorion (1997). The BSC (199613)  guidelines
specify a lo-day  VaR for a 99% confidence level, i.e., the maximum loss that
can occur with a 99% probability in a lo-days period. The lo-day  period
is motivated by the fact that in cases of severe market stress, markets can
become very illiquid. As mentioned earlier, unprofitable parts of the portfolio
can in such cases not be timely liquidated. The internal risk management
model of the bank can be used to compute the VaR. This VaR has to be
reported to the supervisor on a regular, e.g., quarterly, basis. The capital
reserve requirements dictated by the supervisor are then directly proportional
to the reported VaR.
Capital requirements have a direct impact on the profit opportunity set
of the bank. Therefore, abstracting from the bank’s own incentive to hold
capital reserves for risk management, the capital reserves required by the
supervisor are undesirable for the bank from a pure profit point of view.
Given this disincentive of banks to hold capital reserves, it is interesting to
investigate whether banks have any impetus to construct adequate internal
models for risk management. It might be argued on intuitive grounds given
the above line of reasoning, that banks are inclined to use models that return
low VaR values for reporting, see also Daniellson et al. (1997). This holds
particularly if the amount of capital reserves deemed necessery  by the bank’s
risk management falls below that required by the supervisory institution.
That this is regarded as a serious problem is illustrated by the BSC (1996a)
report on backtesting internal models. The BSC has designed guidelines to
judge the adequacy of the bank’s internal risk management model in captur-
‘ing the true market risks of the bank. If there is evidence to suspect that the
model is inadequate, monetary penalties are imposed. Suspucion  is aroused
if the actual trading profits fall below the VaR too often compared with the
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required confidence level of 99%. Ultimately, a revision of the internal model
can be imposed by the supervisor.
The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we investigate whether
the present BSC (1996a,b)  guidelines on the use of internal models in con-
junction with a backtesting procedure motivate banks to construct models
that adequately capture the true market risk of the bank. Second, we con-
sider the construction of optimal backtesting procedures that provide banks
with a sufficiently strong incentive to construct adequate risk management
models. These optimal procedures can then be confronted with the present
BSC proposals.
The adequacy of the internal models approach as a useful tool for supervi-
sion has been debated in the literature by proponents of the pre-commitment
approach, see, e.g., Kupiec and O’Brien (1995a,b,  1996, 1997). Others argue
that, when used in conjunction with a backtesting procedure, the internal
models approach has several advantages over the pre-commitment approach,
see Gumerlock (1996). Kupiec (1995),  however, argues that given the in-
formation regularly available to the supervisory institution, it is difficult to
develop good statistical backtesting procedures that enable one to detect
fraud models at an early stage. Although the aim of the present paper is
not to resolve this controversy completely, the results can be used to assess
the adequacy of the present Basle proposals in preventing excess risk-seeking
behavior and systematic under-reporting of the true market risk.
Two major conclusions emerge from this paper. First, the present pro-
posals for backtesting internal risk models are highly inadequate given the
analytic framework used in the paper. The penalty set in the BSC (1996a)
report for using internal models that produce substantial under-estimates of
the true market risk is too low to discourage banks from using such models
for reporting purposes. Second, if the supervisor minimizes the (expected)
quadratic mismatch between the true and the reported VaR, the optimal
penalty function turns out to be a type of step-function. If the number of
actual trading losses is sufficiently small, no penalty is imposed in future
periods. If the number of trading losses above the reported VaR exceeds a
certain threshold, however, severe penalties are imposed.
The second conclusion of the present paper gives rise to some interesting
policy implications. All results in the paper are obtained under the assump-
tion that the bank knows the true distribution of its profits. In reality, this is
not realistic, such that a more gradual penalty scheme could be appropriate
to account for the uncertainty of model misspecification. But even given  this
relaxation, the maximum (optimal) punishment found is still substantially
higher than that proposed in BSC (1996a).  A practical strategy to implement
these substantial penalties would be to use ‘sticky’ penalty schemes that af-
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feet the profit opportunity set over several future periods. These seem easier
to implement than schemes that only allow for a large one-time reduction in
future profits.
The paper is set up as follows. In Section 2, the basic framework is laid
out. A model is presented capturing the salient features of the BSC guide-
lines on the use of internal models and the associated backtesting procedure.
Section 3 reports numerical results for an evaluation of the present Basle
proposals. Section 4 describes the design of optimal backtesting procedures
from the supervisory point of view. Concluding remarks and suggestions for
future research are contained in Section 5.
2. Basic framework
As explained in the introduction, the basic framework for evaluating the Basle
guidelines for model backtesting in the present paper is centered around a
fixed portfolio of assets and liabilities. We abstract from the interaction of
supervisory regulations and active asset and liability management of banks.
This is a limitation of the present framework and we come back to it in the
concluding section of this paper.
The internal models approach advocated by the Basle Supervisory Com-
mittee (BSC) allows banks to design their own models for risk management.
The motives underlying this approach are explained more fully in, e.g., the
amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks, BSC (199613).
Given a fixed portfolio of assets and liabilities, choosing an internal model for
computing VaR is tantamount to picking the VaR itself. If we wish to study
the adequacy of internal models for assessing true market risks, therefore, we
can focus on a comparison between the VaR chosen by a bank’s management
and the true VaR dictated by the market. Focusing directly on the VaR
chosen by the bank’s management allows for a considerable simplification of
the subsequent modeling process.
The VaR reported by the bank translates directly into a number for re-
quired capital reserves for that bank. In particular, the capital requirements
for market risk amount to three times the reported VaR. Capital reserves
cannot be used for direct profit making purposes, and as such form an im-
pediment to the profit objective of the bank. One can expect, therefore,
that banks may be inclined (from a pure profit point of view) to choose VaR
measures that are too low compared to the possible movements of the mar-
*ket.  Partly in order to overcome this problem, the BSC (1996a) has laid
out a framework for backtesting internal models using realized returns on
portfolios held by banks. Given the results of Kupiec (1995),  the proposed
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backtesting procedure seems one of the most reliable tests available. It works
approximately as follows. Over a period of one year or 250 trading days, the
realized day-to-day returns on the bank’s portfolio are compared to the VaR
of the bank’s portfolio. By counting the number of times the realized re-
turn falls below the reported VaR, the supervisor obtains an idea about the
adequacy of the bank’s internal model for describing the true market risks.
Large numbers of violations of the reported VaR signal a model that under-
estimates the true market risk of the bank’s portfolio. If the number of
violations of reported VaR exceeds a certain threshold, the supervisor will
increase the scaling factor for VaR, resulting in a higher amount of required
capital reserves and a larger burden on profit opportunities. Consequently,
by augmenting the internal models approach with a backtesting procedure,
supervisory institutions present banks with a trade-off between present and
future profit opportunities. On the one hand, reducing the reported VaR
lowers the required capital reserves and, thus, increases the amount of funds
available for profit making. On the other hand, reducing the reported VaR
leads to a higher probability of violations of VaR by realized portfolio re-
turns. Such violations are translated into a higher scaling factor for VaR in
future periods and, thus, into increased capital requirements and reductions
in the amount of funds available for direct profit making.
The BSC distinguishes three zones relating to the number of violations
of reported VaR by realized trading losses. These zones are given in Table 1.
In the Green zone, the number of violations is small, such that the internal
model can be deemed adequate for capturing the true market risk. Conse-
quently, no increase in the VaR scaling factor is required. In the Yellow zone,
doubt arises as to the integrity and/or validity of the bank’s model. This is
reflected in the increase in the VaR scaling factor for capital requirements.
If the number of violations is larger than or equal to 10, i.e., if the reported
VaR is a 4% VaR rather than a 1% VaR, the model is judged inadequate. In
that case, the scaling factor is raised to 4 and the bank is likely to be obliged
to revise its internal model for risk management.
We model the above framework as follows. We assume that the bank uses
the objective function
T - l
min Ea 3 . r(0) * V&,(O)  + C eCpt  . r(t)  . VdL(t)  * f(t,  VaR,(t  -  1)) .
t=1
(1)
The operator Ea(.) d enotes the expectations operator given the available in-
formation at time 0. The minimization in (1) is done with respect to the
reported VaR numbers at times t = 0, . . , T - 1, If&?(t).  This means that
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Table 1
This table contains the number of violations during a 250
day period of reported 1% VaR figures by realized returns
on a bank’s portfolio and the corresponding scaling factor
for VaR for determining the capital reserves associated with
market risk. Source: Basle Committee on Banking Super-
vision (1996a),  Table 2.
Zone Number of exceptions Scaling factor
0 3.00
1 3.00
Green Z o n e 2 3.00
3 3.00
4 3.00
5 3.40
6 3.50
Yellow Z o n e 7 3.65
8 3.75
9 3.85
Red Zone 2 10 4.00
the bank chooses its internal model(s) such as to maximize the direct profit
opportunities. The return rates r(t) are either internal rates of return or mar-
ket rates. So the objective function in (1) gives the present value of present
and future opportunity costs due to supervisory regulations. Discounting
takes place at the (net) rate e P -  1. The quantity f(t, a)  in (1) is a random
variable which is explained next.
The random variable f (t,  VaR, (t - 1)) d enotes the VaR multiplication
factor and reflects the proposed policy of the BSC as explained above and
in Table 1. We assume that the bank may choose its internal model at most
once every year, and that the supervisory institution evaluates this model by
means of the backtesting procedure every year. Taking 250 trading days in
a one-year period, we follow BSC (1996a) and consider the events that daily
trading losses over the past year fall below the reported VaR figures as inde-
pendent drawings from a certain distribution. Given our present framework
where we treat the portfolio of the bank as fixed, this means that the men-
tioned events are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) drawings
from a Bernoulli distribution. Consequently, the total number of violations
over a one-year period has a binomial distribution with parameters n = 250
and p E [0, l]. The probability p is determined by the internal model and the
-true distribution governing market outcomes. We describe this by setting
p = 8(W) < -VaL(t)), (2)
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where P,(.)  denotes the true distribution function of the bank’s profit II(t).
The random variable f (.) now links the number of violations to the VaR
scaling factor for the next period through the mapping laid out in Table 1. We
assume that the random variables f(t, .) are independent from the (internal)
return rates r(t).
Given the specification for f(t, a)  it is easy to see that lowering the re-
ported VaR has two effects. First, there is a direct effect in the objective
function (l), because the reserve requirement based on the reported VaR
causes opportunity costs to the bank. Second, lowering the reported VaR in-
creases the probability p in (2), such that the expectation of f (.)  is increased.
This results in a larger penalty for future VaR figures in the objective func-
tion.
In the next sections we address the question whether the VaR reported by
the bank’s management (Va&) is an adequate reflection of the bank’s true
risk number (Vu&).  Therefore, we introduce the parameters c(t), which are
defined through
VaR,(t)  = (1 + c(t))Vc&(t). (3)
The constants c(t) are a kind of safety indices. Positive values of c(t) indicate
that the bank chooses to employ an internal model for risk management
that over-estimates the true risks taken by the bank. Alternatively, negative
values of c(t) indicate that the bank uses a risk model that produces overly
risky behavior from a supervisory point of view. In such cases the capital
reserves for market risk held by the bank fall below the required amount of
reserves based on the true market risk and the supervisory regulations.
We complete the basic framework by describing what happens if a bank
enters the red zone mentioned in Table 1. According to BSC (1996a), if a
bank enters the red zone closer inspection of the bank’s internal risk man-
agement model by the supervisor is warranted. We model this by adding the
following condition to the evolution of c(t) in (3):
c(t) = c”(t) if f(s, VaR,(s  - 1)) < 3 for all s 5  t,c*(t) otherwise. (4
The bank now has to optimize its objective function over cm(t) instead of
c(t). The values c*(t) are set by the supervisory institution and describe the
consequences of entering the red zone in Table 1. We adopt the a very simple
strategy for the supervisor by setting c*(t) E 0. So if the trading losses of
a bank violate the bank’s reported VaR more than 9 times during a period
of 250 days, the bank’s reported \raR  is changed to the true VaR for all
present and future periods. The supervisor can t,ry  to achieve this by close
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insfiection  of the bank’s internal model. It may seem somewhat optimistic to
assume that, the supervisor will always be able to set c*(t) G 0. Describing
the risk of a bank’s portfolio requires expert insight into the operation and
interaction of all the bank’s financial instruments. Such expert knowledge
may not always be at hand within the supervisory institution, e.g., due to
time constraints. Therefore, it may well be the case that c*(t) is either slightly
positive or negative. We comment on the sensitivity of our numerical results
with respect to the choice of c*(t) in Section 3.
Although the present framework allows us to address several important
questions related to supervision and the internal models approach advocated
by the BSC, there are also several limitations. First, as mentioned before, we
do not consider the interaction between supervisory regulations and active
asset and liability management by banks. Active balance sheet management
can be used as an additional instrument by the bank for reducing the number
of future VaR violations if an increase in the VaR scaling factor becomes more
likely because of realized VaR violations during the course of a year. Second,
we have not modeled any credibility issues related to a large number of VaR
violations. Credibility issues could play a role in the relationship between the
bank and the supervisor or between the bank and its customers. Third, the
present framework does not incorporate the guidelines of the BSC on auxil-
iary model testing, such as stress testing, see the BSC (199613). Stress tests
reveal the internal model’s behavior under adverse market circumstances and
can in certain cases trigger a prompter reaction from the side of the super-
visor concerning the model’s adequacy. Finally, we have taken a simplistic
pure profit point of view for the bank. Of course, apart from a profit mo-
tive every bank has a drive to manage its returns as well as its risks. This
means that the bank has an impetus on its own to hold capital reserves if its
market risk is high. This can be captured by imposing lower bounds on the
allowable values of c(t) in (3). The capital requirement deemed necessary by
the bank, however, may differ considerably from the amount required by the
supervisory institution. Therefore, the present framework is still useful for
investigating the adequacy of bank’s internal risk models from a supervisory
point of view.
3. Evaluation of the present guidelines
In this section we conduct some numerical experiments in order to assess
Che  effectiveness of the present BSC (1996a) proposals for backtesting inter-
nal risk management models. As mentioned in Section 2, the backtesting
procedure uses a period of 250 trading days or approximately one trading
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year. Throughout this section we only consider 1% VaR measures, as this is
most in line with the BSC (199613) guidelines for bank supervision. Further-
more, we assume that the bank has a planning period of T years and that
the reported VaR measure VaR,(t)  = (1 + c(t))\  -u&(t)  must be kept fixed
during the planning period, unless it is revised explicitly by the regulator
because of an excess of VaR violations. This means that c”(t) in (4) is fixed
to cm. We further simplify the problem by abstracting from fluctuations in
the opportunity cost rate r(t). We comment on the effect of relaxing this
simplification further below. The objective function (1) can now be written
as
min r.  VaRt  -
I?*
f(0) * (1+  cm)  + (5)
T - l
c
e-@  . Eo [(l + c(t)) . f(t. (1 + c(t)) * VaR,)] .
t=1
where T = r(t) denotes the (time-invariant) opportunity cost rate. We as-
sume that p = ln(l.l), such that the discount rate is 10%. The sensitivity
to the value of p is discussed further below. In order to rewrite the objective
function in a more transparant way, we first compute the expected future
capital reserves required by the supervisory regulations. To save on nota-
tion, f(t) is used as a shorthand for f(t, (1 + c(t)) . IfaRt).  Note that for
tz1
& [Cl  + c(t)> . m =
l-30  [ (1 + c(t)) * f(t)1  f(s) < 4 v s E (1,.  . . ) t - 1}] *
P [f(s) < 4 v s E (1:. . . ) t -  l}] +
I.30  [(l + c(t)) . f(t)\ 3 s E (1..  . . ) t - l}  : f(s) >_ 41  *
P[3 s E {l,..., t- 11: f(s) L 41, (6)
with f(t) being i.i.d. The distribution of f(t) can be derived as follows. Let
x(t),  t = 1,. . . >T - 1, denote a set of i.i.d. binomial random variables with
parameters n = 250 and p(c(t))  as in (2). f(t) is then given by f(t) =
j(X(t)),  with f(a)  the mapping as defined in Table 1. Define I;” as
t3” = 2 (y) p(c”)i[l -  r)(C7fl)]n--i.
i=o
(7)
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Wk  then ham-c‘
nL
tt = P[f(s)  <4V’sE  {1,...,t}]
=  P[X(s)  <  10VsE  {1,...,t}]
- P [x(t)  < 101  X(s) < 10 v s E (1,.  . . ) t -  l}] .
P  [X(s) < 10 v s E (1,.  . . ) t - l}]
= rl”c1, (8)
such that, c?  = (<y)“. The first term on the right-hand side of (6) can now
be rewritten as
(E;“)t-’ . [(l + c*)  . E,” + (c” - c’)  . A”], (9)
with
E,” = 2 ‘,” J(i) . p(c”)i[l -  p(P)y,
0
(10)
i=o
and
A” = 2 y f(i)  .  p(~Y)~[l  -  p(cm)lnPi.
0
(11)
i=o
Note that E,“” is a number and must not be confused with the expectations
operator Eo(.). -Analogously, the second term on the right-hand side of (6)
can be rewritten as
[l -  (Ky’]  * [(l +  c*)  * IS,‘]  ) (12)
with
The objective function (5) can now be rewritten as
T - l
mincm
r . Vu& . f(0) . (1 + cm) + C  e+.
t=1
[(ET)“-’ . ((1 + c’)  . Er + (c” - c’)  . A”) +
(1 - (<T”)“-‘)  * (1 + c”) * E;]
1
(14)
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.Note that I;“,  E,“:  and An’  depend on the ~:alue  of’ c”‘. Using straigtforward
algebra, (14) can be further simplified as
min r + VaRt  .cm C
f(0) . (1 + c”)  +
e-p  1 - (JTe-p)T-l
1 - eye-p
. [(l + c*)  . (El,”  -  E;)  + (c” -  c’)  . A”]
1 - e-P’CTpl)
e-p.(l+c*).E,‘.  1-e-p
It is clear from (15) that c, has several different effects on the objective
function. First, there is a direct effect by the multiplication factor cm in
several places. Second, increasing cm leads to a decrease in the probability of
VaR violations and, thus, to a decrease of [;“. Finally! a decreased probability
of VaR violations leads to a lower expected VaR scaling factor for future
periods, i.e., to smaller values of E,”  and A”.
Before we can actually compute the optimal value of cm, we have to specify
a functional form for p in (2). We assume that the profit II on the bank’s
portfolio follows a Student t distribution with v degrees of freedom. The
Student distribution nests the familiar normal distribution for v + co. By
considering Student t distributions instead of the normal, we can study the
effect of leptokurtosis on the optimal model choice of the bank. Leptokurtosis
is a common phenomenon in financial markets, see, e.g., Pagan (1996) and
Campbell et al. (1997). The probability of a violation of reported VaR now
becomes
p(c) c p = pt(lI  < -(l  + c) . IFaRt), (16)
with p(0) = I’%,  and where P,(.) denotes a Student t distribution function
with u degrees of freedom. Define pn and an to be the mean and standard
deviation of II, respectively. Furthermore, let T,(.)  be the cumulative distri-
bution function (c.d.f.) of the standard Student t distribution with v degrees
of freedom, and let T;‘(.)  denote the inverse standard c.d.f. Finally, let SR
be the Sharpe-ratio of the profit random variable. i.e., SR = pn/air. Using
these definitions and the fact that
VaR,  = -,cL~  -  (1 - 2v-l) * anT,I1(O.O1),
p(c) can be rewritten as
rI - MI
(1  _  2v-l)an  <
-(l  + c) . ivaRt  -  pn
(1 - 2o-‘)an >
1 2 \s~~~~~~: JANUARY 7, 1998
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=  T,  (l+c)q-l(o.ol)+  v-2  .
(
c.u.SR
>
(17)
It follows directly from (17) that p(0)  = 1%. Furthermore, (17) reveals
that the probability of future VaR violations not only depends on the model
chosen, i.e., on c, but also on the degree of fat-tailedness (v) of profits and on
the overall risk of the bank’s portfolio through the presence of the Sharpe-
ratio SR. Banks with high Sharpe-ratios profit less from choosing safe models
(c > 0) in terms of reductions in p(c) than banks with low Sharpe-ratios. This
is most easily understood by considering two banks with the same value of an,
but different Sharpe-ratios. In that case, the bank with the higher Sharpe-
ratio has a safer portfolio and, thus, a smaller true VaR figure. Increasing the
true VaR by the same percentage amount for both banks, therefore, reduces
the probability of VaR violations comparatively more for the bank with the
low Sharpe-ratio, because the nominal shift in the VaR for this bank is larger
than for the bank with the high Sharpe-ratio. Figure 1 presents graphs of
the objective function in case P,(e)  is the normal distribution (v + 00).  The
objective function is plotted for different values of the planning horizon T
and several values of the Sharpe-ratio  SR.
Several things can be noted in Figure 1. First of all, a local minimum of
the objective function is situated at cm < 0 for all curves presented for which
SR < 2. This means that banks have an incentive to choose overly risky
internal risk management models. We concentrate on the local minimum
for the remaining discussion and call it the optimal value of cm. This is not
unreasonable, given there is a natural lower bound on the values of cm allowed
by the supervisor. According to the BSC (199613) guidelines, the reported
VaR based on the internal model may not fall below 50% of the VaR based on
the standard BSC approach. This puts a lower bound on the allowable values
of cm. Furthermore, the bank possibly has its own lower bound for allowable
values of cm due to risk aversion motives which are not incorporated in the
present framework, see the discussion in Section 2. The magnitude of the
optimal cm is substantial, indicating that it is optimal for the bank to report
an under-estimate of the true VaR by 25% or more if 2’  = 2 and SR > 0.5.
For longer planning horizons, the mismatch between true and reported VaR
is generally smaller, but still substantial. The increase in the optimal value
of cm for larger values of the planning horizon T is intuitively clear. If more
future opportunity costs are taken into account and if the internal risk model
must be chosen once and for all, then a safer risk management model will,
‘ceterus  paribus,  result in a smaller value of the objective function. The effect
is more pronounced if we set c* > 0 (not shown). In that case the expected
future opportunity costs of the bank increase, because the default model
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Figure 1
The figure contains the objective function (15) for different values of the Sharpc-ratio (SR)
and different lengths of the planning horizon (T). 100.  c tlenotes  the percentage increase
of the reported VaR (VaR,) with respect to the true VaR (T,waRt).  At the local minimum
of each curve, a vertical line indicates the c-value corresponding to this local minimum.
The discount rate used for constructing the plots is 10%. The bank has to adopt the true
model if it enters the red zone of Table 1, i.e., if c*  = 0. Wit,hout  loss of generality, r.VaRt
is set to one, such that the vertical axis measures the value  of the objective function (15)
in units of r . VaRt.
T=2 T=lO
- SR=O.Or----l I- SR=0.5SR=  1 .O--- SR=  1.5
(c*) sets a higher VaR for reporting purposes thiln the true VaR. Even in
this case, however, the optimal values of cn remain negative, such that it
is still profitable for the bank to report under-estinrates of its true VaR to
the supervisor. Extreme parameter configurations are needed (e.g., T = 100,
c* = 3) to drive the optimal value of cm to the positive half-line.
Second, and related to the first characteristic. of Figure 1, t,he  excess
degree of prudency  of t,he  internal risk model rises if the discount rate is
smaller (not shown). Smaller discount rates imply  that future opportunity
costs are weighed more heavily in the objective function. Choosing a reported
VaR below the true market risk, i.e., cm < 0, causes an increase in (expected)
opportunity costs during future periods. Consequently, the optimal value of
Vu& (or c”) is decreasing in the discount rate p.  Note that for extreme
discounting p + CQ,  only the first period opportunity costs are taken into
account, such that the objective function becomes monotonic in cm.
Third note the non-monotonic shape of the objclctive  functions in c”. For
Cm = -1, the report,ed VaR in the first period eqrr;\ls  0. Of course, t,his is an
unreasonable value given the BSC lower bound 011  reported VaR mentioned
above. By looking at cm = -1, however, it is clear that for significant under-
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estimates of the true \iiR. the bank is (almost surely) forced in the next
period to adopt the true model as an internal risk management model, i.e.,
to set c(i)  = c* = 0 for t 2 1. Consequently, for extreme under-estimates
of the true VaR, the ol>jcctive function becomes linear in cm with slope
coefficient T . f(0) . Van,  = 3 . T . Va&.  For extreme over-estimates of the
true VaR, the opposite haljpens.  In that case future VaR violations become
extremely unlikely, such that the objective function effectively collapses to
r * VaRt. f(0) * (1+ c”) +
1 -  pP1)
1 -e-P  ’ (18)
which is again linear in Y with a slope coefficient larger than T . f(0) .
Vu&.  In between these two extremes, there is a range of values for cm to
link the two different. linear segments. It is in this range that the trade-
off between reductions in present opportunity costs versus an increase in
expected future opportunity costs becomes really apparent through the non-
monotonic behavior of the objective function.
Fourth, the Sharpe-ratio has a negative impact on the optimal value of
cm in the figures presented. Banks with less risky portfolios in terms of
higher Sharpe-ratios  chooscl  internal models that set a lower VaR for reporting
purposes. -4s  mentioned earlier, a bank with a high Sharpe-ratio profits less
in terms of a reduction in expected future opportunity costs when the bank
increases its reporting VaR..  Therefore, the bank with a large Sharpe-ratio
places more emphasis on reducing present instead of future opportunity costs.
This results in lower values of c chosen by banks with higher Sharpe-ratios.
To conclude the discussion of Figure 1, we briefly comment on the effect
of interest rate movements on the results obtained so far. If one expects in-
creases in the interest rate r(t), future opportunity are weighed more heavily
in the objective function compared to present opportunity costs. Following
the previous line of argument, this means that banks will be inclined to in-
crease the degree of prudency of their internal risk models. The reverse holds
if decreases in the interest, rate are expected.
We now turn to a discussion of the robustness of our results with respect
to the degree of fat-tailedness of the profit distribution. The degree of fat-
tailedness can be tuned by setting the parameter v. The larger the value of v,
the more the profit distribution resembles the familiar normal distribution.
Changing Y  triggers several different effects. First, decreasing v shifts the
1% quantile T;‘(O.Ol)  to the left. Second, for lower values of u the Sharpe-
ratio becomes more important for the effect of cm on the probability of VaR
violation p(c”).  If two banks have the same Sharpe-ratio, the bank with the
fatter-tailed profit distribution profits less from an increase in the prudency
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The figure contains the (locally) optimal percentage incrcasc~  of the reportetl VaR with
respect to the true VaR,  i.e., 100 . cm.  The objective func,tion  used is (15). The Sharpe-
ratio used for constructing the figure is SR = 1.0. The optimal value of c is graphed as a
function of the planning horizon T and the degree of fat-tailedness 3/u.  Higher values of
3/v  indicate that the underlying distribution is more fat-tailed. Discounting is at a 10%
rate, while the default risk management model is the true model, i.e., c*  = 0.
level (c”)  of the reported VaR. Third, there is an effect of v through the c.d.f.
T,(.)  used to compute p(P) in (7). The total impact of the combination of
these three effects is difficult to predict a priori. Therefore, we compute the
optimal value of cm using the objective function (13) for different values of
the planning horizon T and different degrees of lcptokurtosis  u. The results
are presented in Figure 2. Note that we use 3/v  instead of v as a plotting
variable for reasons of layout. The normal dist,ribution  now corresponds to
3/v = 0, while the most fat-tailed (finite variance)  distribution considered is
3/v  = 1, or v = 3.
Note that in order to construct Figure 2, the Sharpe-ratio is kept fixed.
In effect, this means that the variance of the profit distribution is kept fixed
as the degree of fat-tailedness 3/u is increased. This leads to a composite
effect. First, larger values of 3/v lead to fatter tails, such that extreme profits
become more likely. Second, if the variance is held fixed, larger values of 3/v
lead to an increased precision (v/(on . (v - 2))) of the Student t distribution
and, thus, to a decrease in the probability of extreme profits. For more details
on this, see Lucas and Klaassen (1996).
The increase in the optimal value of P as ;I function of T for fixed v
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is evident in Figure 2. Ftlrthermore,  the optimal value of cm is decreasing
in the d(>gree  of leptokllrtosis  3/v  for fixed T. This means that the effect
of v through a reduced affect of cm on p(c”)  governs the composite effect
mentionctl above. Banks with a higher value of 3/v obtain relatively less
reward from raising their reported VaR above the true level (c > 0) in terms
of a decrease in expected future opportunity costs, see (17). Consequently,
for short planning horizons, these banks will be more inclined to emphasize
reductions in present opportunity costs by choosing a, ceterus paribus, lower
value of 8”.  Figure 2 revcals  that this effect may be so strong that the bank
will even opt for reporting VaR values more than 7070  below the true risk
level if the profit distribution is fat-tailed, e.g., 3/1/  = 1.
To conclude this section, we summarize the main findings. If a bank is
forced by the supervisory institution to pick an internal risk model for the
entire planning period: and if this model is subjected to backtesting accord-
ing to the BSC (1996a) report, banks generally select overly risky internal
risk management models. The effect is more pronounced for shorter planning
horizons: smaller discount rates, fatter tails for the profit distribution, and
higher values of the Sharp+ratio.  By contrast, if the default model upon en-
tering the red zone overestimates the true VaR, i.e., if c* > 0, relatively more
prudent risk management  models are chosen. Extreme parameter configu-
rations are needed to dri\-o  the (locally) optimal value of cm to the positive
half-line.
4. Designing optimal backtesting procedures
So far, we have concentrated on the optimal choice of the bank’s report-
ing VaR given the super\-isory regulations as laid out in the BSC (1996a,b)
guidelines. We now turn to a second important question. Given the bank’s
incentive to substantially under-estimate the true VaR for reporting pur-
poses, what is the optimal backtesting approach for the supervisor? It is
clear from the previous section that the monetary penalties as proposed by
the BSC (1996a) are insufficient to guarantee a close match between reported
and true \.aR.  We expect, t,herefore,  that optimal backtesting procedures will
set much higher monetary penalties than the ones presented in Section 2. It
is the aim of the present section to quantify such optimal penalty schemes
and associated backtesting procedures.
Before we can proceed with the analysis, some choices must be made
-regarding the objectives of the supervisor and the instruments available for
achieving these objectives. Note that the bank’s optimal value of cm depends
on several parameters: namely the planning horizon T, the discount rate p,
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the bank’s Sharpe-ratio SR, and the degree of’ f’at-tailedness of the profit
distribution as characterized by the degrees of’ freedom parameter u. We
again abstract from fluctuations in the opportunity cost rat,cl r(t), which
also have an effect on the optimal value of the  bank’s reported VaR. We
assume that the bank has some prior ideas concerning the values  of the
above parameters. These ideas, possibly updated by empirical research, are
summarized in the form of a (posterior) distribution function T(T, p, SR, v).
The supervisor now minimizes the objective function
&r  (Cc”,‘)  , (19)
where E,(.)  denotes the expectations operator with respect to the posterior
distribution ;ry. (19) states that the supervisor minimizes the  (quadratic)
percentage mismatch between the true VaR and the reported VaR. If this
minimization has to be carried out for known vallles  of T, p, SR! and v, the
posterior distribution can be chosen to have a unit mass point at the known
parameter values. Alternatively, if an adequate backtesting procedure is
needed for a broader range of parameter values. a non-degenerate support of
the posterior distribution can be chosen.
In this section we treat p and T as given. The VaR mismatch is thus
averaged with respect to SR and u only. The results are remarkably stable
with respect to variations in p and T, such that we only report the findings
for eP  -  1 = 10% and T = 10. We assume that t,he  remaining posterior dis-
tribution is uniform on a grid of values for (SR:  ll). \\‘e consider I/  = 5,10,  oo
and SR = v. SR’/(v  - 2), with SR’ = 0.5,l.O. 1.3. The limited number of
combinations taken into account is motivated b!.  two reasons. First, the op-
timization problem using objective function (19) is very computer intensive.
-4  simple choice for the posterior distribution can speed up the  calculations
considerably. Second, the optimal solution is mainly driven by the corners
of the (SR, v)-grid  considered. Therefore, we do not expect to lose much in-
formation when discarding many intermediate combinations of Sharpe-ratios
and degrees of freedom parameters.
We now turn to the available instruments for minimizing the  objective
function (19). Given the framework laid out in Sections 2 and 3. we have
as possible instruments the length of the backtesting period 71; the  penalty
function f(i), and the choice of the default model c*.  We concentrate on
the first two of these. The value of c* is zero in all computations presented
below. Positive values of c* result in a permancrlt  increase in opportunity
costs. Using the present value of these opportunity costs, positive values
of c*  can be represented by high temporary ptrIlalties,  i.e.. by.  high values
of f(i). Some unreported experiments reveal that the qualitative results
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of the proscnt section rcllll;lin  unaltered if the yearly backtesting procedure
(n = 250) is shortened t ()  il bi-annual or a quarterly frequency. Therefore,
we only present the reslllts  for n = 250. Note, however, that shortening
the backtcsting period \voIlld have adverse effects on the general statistical
reliabilit!-  of the backtestillg  procedure, see Kupiec (1995):
For the function f(i). \ve consider the following parametric specification:
3 for 0 5 i < 4,
f(i) = f(4) + c~/(l  + esp(cul.  (i -  ao)))  for 4 < i < 10, (20)
f(9) for 10 5 i,
with ao,  al, and cy2  paralneters  that can be tuned by the supervisor. We
assume that a1  < 0, such that (20) is a scaled version of the logistic distri-
bution function. The parameter (~2  determines the maximum penalty that
can be imposed, while (1 cl and LY~  determine the number of VaR violations
after which the VaR sc;lliug  factor starts to increase and the speed of this
increase, respectively. Tllcl functional specification in (20) can fit a wide va-
riety of penalty functions by an appropriate choice of the parameters. The
sensitivit!-  to the specific. form chosen was checked by performing a similar
experiment  with a full!-  !lon-parametric  version of the penalty function f(i).
The results of both exp~~rilncnts  are very similar. Therefore, we only report
the findings for the specification in (20).
The minimization prol)lem  now goes as follows. For a given set of pa-
rameters cto,  . . . , a2,  the links set their (locally) optimal mismatch between
true and reported VaR. Tile  cm values corresponding to the local minima of
the bank’s objective ful1c.t ion (see Section 3) are squared and subsequently
averaged over all values in the grid for (SR, v) considered. This yields the
objective function valuct  (19) of the supervisor. The supervisor now mini-
mizes this objective  func.tion  with respect to ao,.  . . , a2.  For computational
reasons, we impose an lil)I)er bound on the maximum penalty, ~2  5  CX*.  The
results arc presented in Figure 3.
It is immediately apl)arent  from the left-hand panel in Figure 3 that the
optimal form of f(i) d oes not look at all like the penalty function proposed by
the BSC (1996a).  Three  main differences can be seen. First, the number of
violations for which no adtlitional  penalty is imposed through an increase in
the VaR scaling factor is larger for the optimal penalty function if the upper
bound Q*  is either sufficiently  large or sufficiently small. Second, while the
penalty function proposrd  by the BSC shows a gradual increase from the base
-factor 3 to the maximunl  f’actor  4: the optimal f(i) is a type of step function.
Up to a certain threshold for VaR violations, no penalties are imposed on
the bank. If the number of’ \-aR violations exceeds this threshold, however, a
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The left panel of the figure contains the optimal penalt!.  i’unction  f(i) for t,llc:  supervisor
for various values for the upper bound CY*  on CY~. For lcference,  t,he  penalty  function
proposed by the BSC (1996a) is also presented. i denotes the number of I-aR violations
during the last n = 250 trading days. The planning period used for the figure is T = 10,
while discounting takes place at a rate of 10%. The right panel contains the interval of
optimal percentage mismatches cm over the considered grid of values for the Sharpe-ratio
SR and the degrees of freedom parameter V.  The horizontal axis in the right, panel gives
the value of the upper bound CY’ on CYZ,  while B denotes the penalty function according
to the BSC (1996a) report.
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comparatively constant penalty is imposed. Third. the masimlun increase in
the scaling factor for the Basle proposals falls far below the optinlal maximum
penalty. In particular, the optimal maximum l)(lnalty  a~)l~al’~  t,o  coincide
with the upper bound a* used in the computatiolls.
The right-hand panel in Figure 3 gives insight  into tllc nlilxirnum per-
centage mismatch between true and reported \*i\R,.  It appears that within
the present framework, the Basle guidelines reslllt  in severe under-estimates
of the true VaR. Maximum penalties should bo  scat,  more than t,wic.e  as high
in order to drive the absolute mismatches below G.5’7~.
The practical implementability of the step-type penalty function exhib-
ited in Figure 3 warrants one cautionary remark. The derivations so far hinge
on the assumption that the bank knows its trllcl \‘aR,  while the supervisor
does not. Although it is reasonable to presuppose that the bank has a better
understanding of its VaR than the supervisor, it is unrealistic tc)  assume that
the bank can estimate its VaR without error. If we relax the assumption
of complete knowledge of the true VaR by the  1)illlk.  a more gradual shape
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of the optimal penalty function might be more appropriate in order to ac-
count for the possibility of unintentional VaR  mis-specification by the bank.
Alternatively, the supervisory institution could retain the step-type penalty
function and put the whole burden of accounting for estimation risk on the
bank. This would stimulate tile banks somewhat more to design models that
produce more prudent VaR  numbers.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have evalua.ted  the Basle proposals for the use of internal
models in conjunction with backtesting procedures, BSC (1996a,b).  It turns
out tha.t  the present proposals for imposing penalties on banks that violate
their VaR  l~ouncls  too often, are highly inadequa.te.  The monetary penal-
ties are too low to provide a sufficiently strong incentive to banks to design
interna.l  risk management models t1ia.t  produce good estima.tes of their true
VaR.  Consequently, it is profitable  for banks to report under-estimates of
their true Va.R  to the supervisory institution.
The optimal stra.tegy  for the supervisor given the above findings is to
set much higher monetary penalties on an excess number of VaR  violations.
hloreover,  the penalty function can be made much steeper than in the BSC
(1996a.)  proposal. One obvious \vay  to enhance the pra.ctical implementability
of the higher penalt,y  scheme is to use sticky pena.lt.ies:  instea.d  of a one-time
increase in the Va.R  scaling fact,or  of the bank,  a multi-period increase might
prove more appropriate.
Several interest,ing  questions for fnture research rema.in.  For example, it is
interesting to invcstiga.te tile effect  of active asset and liability management
(.4Lhl)  from the side of tile l>allli  on the optima.1 supervisory policies. If
ba.nl<s are able through active .4LI\I  to limit the number of Va.R  viola.tions  if a
cert,ain  nllmber  of 1’a.R  jriolations 1la.s  already occurred during the supervisory
period, then we expect e\rcn  more severe under-estimates of the true VaR  for
reporting  purposes. hIotleliIlg t.he internal ALN process of the bank, however,
is far from t,rivial,  and more resea.rch  is needed to design aa adequate and
tractable frameivork. It would also he interesting to add uncerta.inty  to the
model in the form of an 111ll<no\vn  value for the true VaR.  Although this
would liighl~~  complicat,e matters Lvitliin  the present framework, it seems more
realistic that neither the l>ClIlli  itself  nor the supelvisor  ca.n come up with a
fa,nltless  cstin1a.t.e  of the true VaR.
.
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